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Economic Integration and State Responses: 
Change in European Industrial Relations since Maastricht 
Guglielmo Meardi 
(forthcoming in British Journal of Industrial Relations) 
 
Abstract: 
The article analyses industrial relations change in the six largest EU countries 
since 1992 in relation to increased internationalisation pressures. Based on 
qualitative and quantitative analysis, it distinguishes between associational 
and state governance, and detects that despite a predominant, but not 
universal, trend of weakening trade unions and collective bargaining, no 
overall liberalisation has occurred in the political regulation of employment 
(employment policies, welfare state, labour law, state support to collective 
bargaining, public sector). Rather than as converging towards neoliberalism, 
industrial relations emerge as more politically contingent and dependent on 
multiple forms of power, which are affected by internationalisation in different 
ways.  
 
Introduction 
Recent international political developments have raised scenarios of ‘new statism’ 
countering the previous trend of global state retrenchment, as exemplified by 
alarmed covers of The Economist (‘The Rise of State Capitalism’, 12 January 2012; 
‘The New Nationalists’, 19 November 2016). This article takes a longer historical 
perspective to discuss whether, within industrial relations (IR), such scenarios are 
really new, and to explain the apparent contradiction between internationalisation 
and re-nationalisation.  
Debates on state and globalisation have oscillates between two extremes. In the 
early 1990s, the study of IR reached the peak of its ‘methodological nationalism’. 
Colin Crouch, in his Industrial Relations and European State Traditions (Crouch 
1993), identified the decisive influence of long-term state traditions (notably: state-
Church relations; guilds’ legacies; opening to trade) on IR. Most comparative studies 
of IR from that period – tellingly organised by country chapters – shared, at least 
implicitly, the same preference for the nation state as the most relevant level of 
analysis. Twenty-five years later, that preference is widely questioned. In the EU 
even more than elsewhere, transnational pressures on the three main actors of IR 
(state, capital, labour) have driven significant changes, raising questions on the 
capacity of national IR institutions to survive. Important recent accounts contrast with 
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Crouch’s one sharply, by identifying a neoliberal convergent trajectory (Baccaro and 
Howell 2017), preferring transnational levels of analysis (Erne 2008) or indicating the 
weakening of national wage bargaining institutions (Visser 2013). As units for 
comparative analysis, economic sectors have gained more importance besides, or 
even in replacement of, countries (Katz and Darbishire 2000, Bechter et al. 2012). 
Tellingly, Crouch himself in his more recent work laments the weakness of states 
facing multinational corporations and neoliberalism (Crouch 2011). Recent 
interpretations of IR in terms of institutional diversity, as in the comparative 
capitalism literature, focus less on state institutions and political factors than on firm-
level ones, and stress diversity amongst a narrow group of capitalist types rather 
than among national states. 
The change that has occurred in IR since ca1990 is associated, chronologically and, 
this article shall argue, causally, with uneven internationalisation, and in particular 
the increased power of mobile capital vis-à-vis immobile labour and national states. 
While this is a global trend, it has been particularly marked, and concentrated in 
time, in Europe, where it has been supported by the most integrated economic 
regional bloc (the EU) and it has been affected by the full product- and labour market 
integration of adjacent regions with different wage levels and labour/capital 
compositions. The East-West integration that started after the fall of the communist 
regimes and was crowned by the EU enlargements of 2004-13 finds no equivalent in 
other continents.  
And yet, in this most integrated continent, with visible shared strains on employment 
relations, country diversity is still apparent not only in formal institutions but in 
outcomes too, as in the case of different and even diverging labour market 
developments since the 2008 crisis. This paper combines qualitative and quantitative 
observations to move beyond convergence vs divergence debates to identify, 
drawing on Wright (2000), how different international pressures affect different 
sources of labour power, and to analyse both associational and political forms of 
labour market governance. 
The article addresses the question of the endurance of state-level IR institutions and 
of the validity of political sociological approaches through three steps. Firstly, a 
review of debates on change in IR defines the explanatory role of internationalisation 
after 1990 and sketches a possible interpretative approach. Secondly, a historic-
institutional summary of the developments of this period in the six largest EU 
countries by population and purchase-power parity GDP (Germany, United Kingdom, 
France, Italy, Spain and Poland) highlights instances of internationalisation effects. 
Finally, the article uses the available, if imperfect, quantitative data to ‘measure’ the 
degree of convergence amongst those six countries. In line with recent insights from 
Thelen (2014) and Crouch (2015) it expands the focus from IR in the narrow sense 
to broader social policies that impact employment. But it goes further, by 
distinguishing between different modes of governance and different arenas of labour 
power, to reveal a more complex trajectory of change than convergence and explain 
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the re-politicisation of industrial relations that internationalisation is, 
counterintuitively, producing.  
 
Change of industrial relations and internationalisation 
The perceived immobility of the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) approach as codified 
by Hall and Soskice (2001) has inspired a surge of interest in the problem of change 
in IR (Crouch 2005, Streeck and Thelen 2005). While providing descriptions and 
classifications of ways in which institutional change does occur, institutional debates 
are yet to provide robust answers to the more crucial questions, i.e. why and in what 
direction change occurs. The VoC itself has moved forward through the 
consideration of actor-based factors, and in particular the dynamics of contestation 
and defection (Hall and Thelen 2009). However, that approach remains ill-placed to 
analyse actor-based factors, as it has little to say on more political dynamics such as 
mobilisation, discourse and conflict. On the other side, historical and discourse-
based institutional approaches have focussed on those processes more, but again 
with outcomes that are either descriptive or excessively abstract. To take the 
authoritative example of Streeck’s (2009) analysis of institutional change in 
Germany, the dense and theoretically-informed account of institutions is not matched 
by similar detail on the actors behind the institutions. The ultimate explanation of 
change in German capitalism is identified by Streeck in the increased autonomy and 
liberalisation of financial institutions, which while having great consequence as an 
historical and theoretical argument, results itself in a degree of economic 
determinism allowing less autonomy to the dynamics of labour relations. 
Against this backdrop of unsatisfactory institutional accounts, Baccaro and Howell 
(2017) elaborated an alternative regulation-theory inspired thesis of a common 
neoliberal trajectory across all OECD countries since the mid-1970s. They define 
‘trajectory’ not merely as a parallel movement, but, importantly, as convergence, if 
not in institutional forms, at least in institutional functioning (Baccaro and Howell 
2017: 15-16). The convergence thesis is partly confirmed by the small-N study by 
Thelen (2014), who identifies the same global liberalisation trend of IR, although in 
different forms and with different outcomes thanks to compensation through labour 
market and welfare policies. By contrast, Kim et al. (2015), in the same OECD set of 
countries as Baccaro and Howell, identify stability within three broad types of IR, and 
Crouch (2015) maintains that there is change within, but also enduring diversity 
among, both broad types and individual countries. 
Neoliberal convergence presupposes a more synchronous process of change than 
at any time in the history of IR hitherto characterised by historical institutional 
diversity even if on the backdrop of some common macro-developments in economy 
and technology. Synchronicity is unlikely to occur without common forces driving a 
simultaneous change in capitalist regulatory mode. Neoliberalism is generally 
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defined as a political project involving the state (Jessop 2002) and aiming at ‘bringing 
about a market order’ (Baccaro and Howell 2017: 16), restore elite power through 
dispossession of lower classes (Harvey 2005) and promote market competition and 
a limited state (Schmidt and Thatcher 2013). As a political process, it cannot be 
easily explained by non-political factors such as technology, which has historically 
been compatible with different political projects, and arguably still is, as exemplified 
by ideas such as ‘accelerationism’ (Srnicek and Williams 2016). Outside 
technological determinism, the most likely explanation for neoliberalism and its 
sudden rise since ca1990 is the shift in power balance between labour and capital 
induced by ‘globalisation’, in particular with the collapse of state socialism in 1989-
91, the formulation of the ‘Washington consensus’ in the same years, and the  
creation of the World Trade Organization in 1995.  
Within Europe, these forces can be linked to more specific policy developments 
starting around 1990: in the 1980s, countries like France, Germany and the UK were 
still going in very different directions – not to speak of Eastern Europe. Since then, 
European integration accelerated through increased market integration through the 
single market (1992), Economic and Monetary Union (1999), Maastricht’s ‘Social 
Chapter’ (1991) and EU enlargement to countries with different capital/labour 
compositions and socio-political traditions (2004-13). These developments 
potentially affect all main IR actors, by fostering the internationalisation of capital, the 
mobility of labour, and the replacement of national with supranational regulations. 
Between 1992 and 2012, the amount of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the EU 
multiplied by eight (data: UNCTAD); the share of internationally mobile EU workers 
more than doubled (data: Eurostat); and the number of EU labour market policies, 
whether ‘hard’ or ‘soft’, exploded, including directives, EU-level collective 
agreements, employment policies, EMU constraints and structural reforms 
requirements.  
At the outset of the 1990s these processes were still mostly neglected in IR research 
(Giles 2000). In the case of the European Communities, Crouch concluded his 1993 
book by dismissing the chances that they could affect national IR (Crouch 1993: 
350). Research on the role of multinational capital in European IR relations was only 
starting and sceptical arguments about the existence of transnational corporations 
(Hirst and Thompson 1996) were influential in labour studies. Even less attention 
was paid to migration: Castles (1986) had just written his ‘obituary of the guest-
worker in Europe’ and Messina (1990) was claiming that labour migration in Europe 
had ended. 
The implications of globalisation for labour relations became soon apparent. The fast 
rise of FDI created pressures for ‘races to the bottom’ and ‘regime shopping’ (Cooke 
2001). Labour mobility, despite being inherently lower than capital mobility, raised 
questions over the state’s control over a territory and therefore the idea of national 
models (Ferrera 2005), and the future of national regulations such as collective 
bargaining and the right of strike (Dølvik and Visser 2011). European Court of 
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Justice rulings, the EU enlargement (Meardi 2012, Crespy and Menz 2015) and the 
imposition of ‘structural reforms’ in crisis countries (Meardi 2014, Erne 2015) 
appeared to confirm earlier criticisms of the EU’s role in IR and welfare states as 
‘negative’ and ‘market-making’, rather than ‘positive’ and ‘market-correcting’ (Streeck 
1995). In this situation, the national models which were so visible in the 1990s to the 
then prolific comparative IR literature quickly started to be seen as ‘in flux’ (Bosch et 
al. 2009), ‘in crisis’ (Dølvik and Martin 2014) or even ‘failed ideas’ (Lehndorff 2012).  
This article approaches the issue by treating countries as unique historical cases and 
avoiding pre-conceptions of ‘national models’, which involve excessive risks of 
functionalist, teleological and normative simplifications. It attempts to advance 
Crouch’s institutional approach through a political sociological lens that integrates 
and advances IR and historical institutional theories. On one side, it places, with 
Polanyi, the inherently political dimension of labour at the centre of the study of IR, 
which challenges economic functionalist views (whether pro-convergence or 
divergence), and allows more precision on which specific institutions matter most 
(the political ones). On the other side, it takes from IR the idea of inherently 
contradictory and ‘structurally antagonistic’ relations (Edwards 1986) and from 
sociology that of dynamic power relations (Wright 2000) to argue that institutional 
change is endogenous to capitalist employment relations: all compromises contain 
the seeds for their own contestation as they raise ever higher expectations on either 
side and open up ever new possibilities for political contestation or exit strategies. 
Analytically, this means paying attention to both long-term political institutional 
constraints, and shifting power balances between labour and capital. Wright (2000) 
identifies different forms of labour power (associational and structural), and different 
spheres of power balance (market, production and politics), which can lead to very 
different historical forms of class compromise (e.g. in the USA and Sweden) and are 
affected by globalisation in different ways.  
These theoretical insights raise the broad hypothesis that the forces of 
internationalisation have different effects in different countries, and on different forms 
of labour power. Specifically, we expect the opening to foreign capital, migration and 
EU politics to vary across countries. And we expect capital mobility to weaken 
labour’s political and market power, but to increase its production power in 
industrialising countries (Silver 2003); migration to undermine labour’s associational 
and market power in receiving countries, but to increase its political one given the 
national-political nature of border controls (and the opposite in sending countries); 
and international organisations to have differential effects depending on their specific 
policies, but generally to reduce labour’s market power through monetary and trade 
integration, and its political power up to the point where they provoke nationalist or 
internationalist reactions. The variation of national institutional setting, international 
exposure and power effects would counteract deterministic convergence, confirming 
for IR a degree of autonomy from the economy and an inescapable political 
dimension.  
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The developments in the six largest EU countries 
Most analyses of change in IR have either focussed on only one or two countries, or 
on larger datasets of OECD or EU countries. Either approach has strengths, but also 
symmetric weaknesses in terms of either generalizability or depth. In order to seek 
an optimal mid-way between coverage and detail, this paper focuses instead on the 
six largest EU countries, accounting for 71% of the EU population. The selection has 
deeper methodological-comparative reasons than the simple numerical weight. 
Country size matters for IR. There is a systematic difference between larger and 
smaller countries in terms of associations’ strength: corporatist countries tend to be 
much smaller than the pluralist ones (Olson 1982, Katzenstein 1985, Crouch 1993). 
Moreover, size matters not just for the dependent variable of this article (change in 
national IR), but also for the independent one, i.e. internationalisation and specifically 
Europeanisation. Large countries, ceteris paribus, are less dependent on trade and 
FDI, are more slowly impacted by sudden population movements, and have more 
weight in international organisations’ decisions.  
The specific number of six is chosen for simple clustering reasons: the gap between 
the sixth and the seventh largest member state (Poland and Romania) is the largest 
in the list of EU countries by population. Moreover, the ‘big six’ group includes a 
theoretically interesting geographic and socio-political variety (East and West, North 
and South, centre and periphery), despite the limitation of not including any Nordic 
country. 
A historical and qualitative investigation of Europeanisation since 1992 was 
conducted primarily through interviews, document analysis and systematic national 
press analysis based on the main centre-left paper, as the one most likely to report 
about both economy and employment relations.1 A total of 49 semi-structured 
interviews with leading experts and protagonists from employer associations, unions, 
government departments, foreign investor associations and migrant associations 
were conducted across the six countries and in Brussels.2 The research was 
conducted in the local languages, to test the penetration of internationalisation by 
following it beyond the internationalised networks of cosmopolitan elites that are 
usually examined by research on transnational factors. While interviews were with 
actors that had been responsible for international contacts (foreign investment 
agencies and associations, trade union international offices, policy makers dealing 
with EU rules implementations), their accounts were then checked through local 
information and documentation. The research involved, in each country, a stay of at 
least one month including attendance to union, employer association and 
governmental meetings and conferences. Table 1 presents a summary of the 
analysis with regard to the national IR effects of the internationalisation forces in the 
six countries.  
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The research detected a number of international effects, but also their unevenness. 
FDI (as a share of capital formation, capital outflows, employment, as well as pace of 
increase), migration (as share of the population and of new employment) and EU 
policies (as relevance and compliance) have different weight in each country, and 
this is in part reflected in the IR consequences. Of the three pressures identified, the 
most important appeared to be FDI, followed by labour movement and as last the EU 
– but all these three forces are mediated by national institutions and the results are 
different country by country. 
 
FDI 
Although multinational companies tend to abide to national collective bargaining 
systems (Marginson and Meardi 2009), their impact on national employment 
relations is particularly visible in countries more dependent on foreign sources for 
capital investment. This is the case in particular for post-communist Poland. In the 
early 1990s, large investors such as Fiat and Lucchini Steel engaged in foundational 
conflicts with the unions with the clear objective of setting new rules in employment 
relations: new laws on privatisation, strikes, trade unions and social dialogue were 
conditioned by those conflicts. Similarly, the loss of major investment plans by Asian 
manufacturers to neighbouring Czechia and Slovakia in the early 2000s pushed the 
government to further liberalise the labour market. Foreign employers were the main 
actors behind the creation of a new, and more assertive, employer association in the 
late 1990s (PKPP-Lewjatan) and foreign companies drove the introduction of new 
working patterns in service sectors such as banking and retail. 
Even in Western Europe foreign companies have been vocal and FDI has become a 
more pressing issue. In Spain, Volkswagen and Ford had a strategy of changing 
traditional employment relations, which was largely successful but only because it 
was concomitant with a generational change in Spanish trade unions (Hauptmeier 
2012): foreign capital and state path dependency interacted, rather than 
counteracting each other. More recently foreign companies have not openly 
contested the Spanish system, preferring to rather ‘hollow out’ sectoral collective 
bargaining by offering better and different company agreements. The American 
Chamber of Commerce in Spain limits its public criticism to rather secondary issues 
such as the long lunch breaks. In France, large foreign companies are major players 
in the employer association Medef and in the chambers of commerce, but when US 
investors express vocal criticism, in a rather anti-American political environment, it 
generally backfires. When the CEO of Titan International wrote a letter to French 
industry minister Montebourg to complain that ‘the French so-called workers. . . don’t 
work longer than 3 hours a day’ and that the ‘crazy French unions own the French 
government’ (Les Echos, 19/2/2013), it attracted universal contempt. In the 
workplace, though, threats of relocations by multinationals such as Bosch in the mid-
2000s were instrumental in achieving company-level concessions, especially on 
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working time. In the UK the influence of multinationals, in particular in undermining 
sector collective bargaining, dates back to previous decades and, within a liberal 
environment, foreign employers no longer differ markedly from national ones.   
FDI has become a factor in IR also where it has a lesser weight as a share of capital 
investment. In the 1990s, perceived low attractiveness for FDI was a core issue in the 
‘Standortdebatte’ (location debate) in Germany, which contributed to paving the road 
for major welfare reforms. The American Chamber of Commerce in Germany criticized 
the works council reform of 2001, but to no avail. Despite the radical tone of its public 
opposition to co-determination, the main work of AmCham Germany is actually on 
advising US companies on how to pragmatically adapt to German regulations and on 
how to minimise their undesired aspects. Even more than in France, threats of 
relocations, e.g. by Siemens, achieved important company-level concessions and 
contributed to the fragmentation and decentralisation of collective bargaining in the 
mid-2000s. Italy is, in this group, the country with the lowest inflows of FDI, which only 
surged with a wave of privatisations around 2000. Multinationals remained marginal in 
Italian debates until 2010, when Fiat-Chrysler (the largest Italian manufacturer, led by 
an Italo-American CEO and headquartered in London) withdrew, after threatening 
relocation of production, from the Italian employer association, from sectoral collective 
bargaining and from national union representation arrangements. This move against 
previously encompassing national regulations (defined by Fiat’s CEO as ‘folklore’ – 
Repubblica, 28/6/2012) triggered the weakening of the Italian employer association, 
whose density fell from 33% in 2009 to 25% in 2014, and further tensions in national 
collective bargaining.  
 
Migration 
Although populist fears of dramatic disruption of labour organisation through 
increased and unfair migrants’ competition are wide of the mark, there have been 
impacts on the behaviour of national actors and on national regulations. In the UK, 
the large and unplanned surge of intra-EU immigrants in the mid-2000s led unions to 
experiment more with community organising, e.g. with the London Living Wage 
campaign and with migrants’ union branches, but gave space also to spontaneous 
protests such as the one for ‘British jobs for British workers’ at the Lindsay refinery in 
2009, and, over time, to mass discontent with the social implications of immigration 
that resulted into the Brexit vote of 2016. Some government policies were amended 
to face labour standard issues emerging from immigration, although rather 
inconclusively: the Gangmasters Licencing Act of 2004 was prompted by the death 
of Chinese cockle-pickers, agency work and zero-hour contract regulations were 
improved and a higher minimum wage was announced in 2015. In the case of the 
2009 Lindsay dispute, the government defended the employers in principle but 
promoted a good settlement for local protesters in practice. In Spain, large and 
unprecedented immigration from both North Africa and Central and Eastern Europe 
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became a central ground for augmented political and state-sponsored servicing roles 
for trade unions, especially on regularisation and on work permit policies, which went 
hand in hand with tripartist governance attempts in the 1990s and 2000s. Pressures 
in construction led to tighter regulations on subcontracting in 2006. Italy witnessed 
fewer immigrants than Spain and less expansion in construction, but the implications 
for IR were similar, forcing the government to introduce draconian rules and 
penalties on agriculture gangmasters in 2016, including making the violation of 
collectively agreed wages a criminal offence. In both countries, immigration occurred 
in deeply segmented labour markets, with more limited effects for the primary, more 
formal segment. In France, unions mobilized foreign undocumented workers in 
spectacular occupation strikes in 2008-10, to gain their regularization through high 
visibility actions, which in turn, despite the low level of corporatism in France, 
achieved stronger political roles and social legitimacy for the unions themselves. 
Labour standard issues with posted workers at large companies such as Alstom re-
legitimised the legally-binding nature of French sectoral agreements, and President 
Macron made the revision of the Posted Workers Directive a symbol of his program.  
Germany limited the opening of its labour market to workers from the new member 
states to 2011 and witnessed slower labour immigration, but waves of refugees in 
the early 1990s and in 2015. Trade unions stepped up their efforts to increase the 
share of foreigners in workplace representation, and to defend them better in 
collective bargaining and in access to apprenticeships, especially after the crisis of 
2008-09 highlighted their higher vulnerability. In 2011, the end of transitional 
arrangements on free movement from the new member states triggered deep 
changes in labour market governance, with the introduction first of sectoral minimum 
wages, and, in 2015, of a national minimum wage (a significant change to traditional 
Tarifautonomie) as well as facilitations for the extension of sectoral collective 
agreements. Poland is different in so far as it was affected by mass emigration. The 
post-2004 emigration wave, combined with demographic decline, helped moving the 
labour market from mass unemployment to labour shortages within few years and 
improving the structural power of labour: real wages increased at the fastest rate in 
the OECD, especially in the sectors most affected by emigration. The minimum wage 
was raised from 40% to 50% of the average wage between 2008 and 2013 and the 
government elected in 2015 proposed a number of social reforms including 
improvement in pensions, child benefits and trade union rights. However, the 
preponderance of labour ‘exit’ on ‘voice’, exemplified by emigration, high employee 
turn-over and mass temporary employment, consolidated the liberal nature of the 
Polish labour market. Labour immigration became relevant only after 2010, mainly 
from Ukraine: in 2016 the OPZZ union set up a Ukrainian branch, and social 
dialogue started on policies to fight the exploitation of migrant labour. 
 
EU 
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The EU influence through Directives and ‘soft’ policies is mediated by countries’ 
different traditions of ‘compliance’ (Falkner et al. 2008). None of the six large 
member states, in reason of exactly their size and relative power, is a particularly 
compliant country in Falkner’s classification. The EU legal influence is more visible in 
countries with more distant legal traditions. In the UK, European social legislation 
was adopted after the Labour party victory of 1997, but over time it became apparent 
that it did not substantially impact employment relations, e.g. in the case of 
Information and Consultation rights. In Poland the adoption of the acquis 
communautaire occurred with more apparent enthusiasm, but it clearly failed to 
foster social convergence with Western Europe. Both Poland and the UK are outside 
the EMU and therefore less affected by European economic governance, whether 
soft or hard, and both countries opted out from parts of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the EU.  
In the EMU countries, the EU sponsored labour market reforms through its 
‘flexicurity’ promotion, but in general employment policies have remained too ‘soft’ to 
produce much mutual learning among member states. In Germany, the Rüffert 
European Court of Justice ruling of 2008 resulted in changes to procurement rules 
rather than to collective bargaining. The liberal reforms of the early 2000s were of 
domestic origin and inspired EU policies, rather being inspired by them. Through 
Jacques Delors, France had influenced the origins of EU social regulations, rather 
than being influenced by it. Later on, ‘flexicurity’ was more openly discussed than in 
Germany, but was also translated into national versions of the concept, such as 
transitional labour markets, and France remained an exceptional case in not 
liberalising temporary employment.  
In Italy and Spain, EMU constraints played a role in promoting tripartite social pacts 
and reforms of indexation and of the welfare state in the 1990s, although judgments 
of these countries’ social systems being ‘rescued by Europe’ (Ferrera and Gualmini 
2004) proved misplaced in the light of the subsequent crisis. The traditional neglect 
of EU social regulations (despite political pro-Europeanism) changed with the 
structural policies recommended or imposed by the EU since 2010 on countries with 
high debt-to-GDP ratios. Two European Commission’s proposals with radical 
implications for employment relations were particularly influential in Italy and Spain, 
and from 2015 in France: first, ‘new wage setting frameworks in order to contribute to 
the alignment of wage and productivity growth at sector/company level’ (European 
Commission 2012), i.e. the decentralization of collective bargaining; second, the 
liberalization of employment protection through a flexible ‘single open-ended 
contract’ that would overcome labour market segmentation (European Commission 
2010). Italy and Spain passed deeper reforms along these lines in 2011-14 under 
pressure from the European Central Bank, than over the previous 20 years (France 
introduced similar reforms in 2016). The changes did not entirely embrace EU 
recommendations, especially in Italy, and led to a slow-down of collective bargaining, 
but not, to date, to its collapse. While if deepened and fully enforced they could 
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radically alter national institutions, they seem to have also created enough political 
resistance to slow them down.  
 
A quantitative assessment of change 
The previous section listed evidence of differential effects of transnational factors on 
national systems. To assess the cumulative effects on national employment 
relations, we need synthetic indicators. Quantitative ones present many limitations 
when taken individually, but sufficiently composite indicators may be able to tell a 
story more robustly. In recent years, quantitative data have been used both to 
underpin the classification of countries within IR typologies (European Commission 
2009, Kim et al. 2015) and to criticise them (Bechter et al. 2012, Baccaro and Howell 
2017).  
The distinctive feature of this analysis is the combination of two analytically 
independent axes, i.e. associational and state governance of IR. This is different 
from Baccaro and Howell’s quantitative analysis, which focuses on five indicators of 
which four are purely associational (bargaining centralisation, bargaining 
coordination, union density and conflict rate), and only one includes, besides 
associations, the state (tripartite bargaining). Baccaro and Howell do consider the 
state, but dismiss social policy and individual labour rights as mechanisms to 
legitimise liberalisation. My approach also differs from Kim et al. (2015) insofar as 
they merge state- and association governance within two outcome-focused axes, 
equity and efficiency. By contrast, I argue here that the state should be included in IR 
analysis much more intimately and dialectically, because of the unavoidably political 
nature of IR and because of the redistributive interactions between collective 
bargaining and welfare state. In particular, the neglect of the welfare state in IR (and 
vice versa) causes a number of shortcomings, not least the inattention to gender 
issues, on which IR interact most closely with legislation and welfare policies 
(O'Reilly and Spee 1998). This approach is therefore closer to that by Thelen (2014), 
who distinguishes between IR, labour market policies, and welfare state. 
If at the peak of trade union power, IR and social policy tended to be studied and 
discussed separately, the recent shift of social policies towards activation and risk 
governance call for their closer integration (Crouch 2015). In line with both 
corporatist theory and regulation theory (Hollingsworth and Boyer 1997), this is 
possible by analytically distinguishing the three modes of governance of economy 
(market and corporate hierarchies), polity (at the national-level, national law and 
national government actions) and society (at the national level, mostly associations, 
although networks and communities may also be relevant). I exclude from this 
analysis a fourth possible mode of governance, community, as apparently less 
influential within Europe (Crouch 2015), and treat market institutions (corporate law 
and financial regulations) as essentially constant across the six countries, given the 
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integration of product and financial markets and the rise of multinational corporations 
in the EU (although there are some differences in the strength of pure capitalist 
institutions such as property and investment rights, the only significant deviation in 
this regard among the six countries, according to the 2015 Index of Economic 
Freedom (Miller and Kim 2015) is the imperfect protection of property rights in Italy). 
The research then focuses on the degree to which state and associational 
regulations intervene by distorting in favour of the employees the outcome that 
market and corporate management would produce in the theoretical (yet unrealistic) 
scenario of full atomisation and freedom from social constraints. 
The analysis compares two snapshots, at the outset of the Europeanisation trends 
identified above, which was also the final point of Crouch’s (1993) analysis, i.e. 1992 
and 2012, twenty years later and the last year with sufficient data availability.3 It 
produces a graphic representation of the degrees of state and associational 
governance on two orthogonal axes. Both indexes of associational and state 
governance are multidimensional, as indicated below (the source of the variables in 
bold is the ICTWSS database, version 5.0 of 2015 (Visser 2015); sources for the 
other variables are indicated in brackets.) 
The index of associational governance is made of three components of equal weight, 
i.e. the organisation level of each side of the employment relationship, and their 
interrelations through collective bargaining. The specific variables are the following 
(Table 2).  
1. Trade union density (UD) 
2. Employer density (ED) 
3. Interrelations, made of three measures: 
3.1. Collective bargaining coverage (adjusted for employee with right of collective 
bargaining) (AdjCov) 
3.2. Co-ordination of collective bargaining (1-5 scale - Coord) 
3.3. Actual level of collective bargaining (i.e. predominant level of collective 
bargaining adjusted by frequency of decentralisation, opening clauses, 
derogation, articulation) (CWB) 
Unlike Baccaro and Howell, I do not include strikes, as notoriously the most difficult 
indicator to compare over time and across countries, and because it is of ambiguous 
interpretation: are more strikes a sign of stronger unions, or of weaker institutions? 
Nor do I include tripartism, which I consider under state governance instead given its 
increasingly political, rather than corporatist, nature (Avdagic et al. 2011). By 
contrast, by using the new indicator of ‘actual level of collective bargaining’ instead of 
the simpler ‘predominant level’ employed by Baccaro and Howell, I can also account 
for the increasingly important processes of derogation and articulation, which were 
central for Crouch and Traxler (1995) and are behind Baccaro and Howell (2017) 
idea of institutional conversion of collective bargaining. I also add employer 
organisation, which is less systematically measured and has not been paid as much 
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attention as unionisation, but whose importance has been demonstrated by the 
effects of disorganisation in places like Eastern Germany and Central Eastern 
Europe.  
The state governance axis of employment relations governance is more complex 
and includes more dimensions. The IR literature has identified five main categories 
of state intervention in employment relations (Meardi 2014), and these are measured 
through the following variables (Table 3).  
1. Statutory regulations 
1.1. Legislation on works councils: works council status (0-2 scale - WC) 
multiplied by works council rights (0-3 scale – WC_RIGHTS)   
1.2. Existence of a minimum wage (nationally: 2; no:0; in certain sectors: 1 - 
NMW)  
1.3. Minimum relative to average wages of full-time workers (OECD.Stat)  
1.4. Strictness of Employment Protection – Individual and collective dismissals 
(regular contracts) (OECD.Stat) 
1.5. Strictness of Employment Protection - temporary contracts (OECD.Stat) 
2. Rules of the game 
2.1. Government intervention in collective bargaining (1-5 scale - GOVINT) 
2.2. Mechanisms for the legal extension of collective agreements (0-3 scale – Ext 
– the indicator does not include functional equivalents of mandatory 
extension and therefore underestimates the degree of state involvement in 
Italy) 
3. Public goods provision 
3.1. Unemployment benefits replacement level, summary measure, which 
provides an indication of the ‘reserve wage’ (OECD.Stat) 
3.2. Social expenditure as a share of the GDP (OECD.Stat) 
4. Support to actors 
4.1. Social Pacts (sum of negotiated and signed pacts, three-year average - ALL) 
4.2. Presence of a National Tripartite Commission (dummy indicator – TC) 
5. As an employer 
5.1. Public sector’s share of employment (OECD.Stat) 
5.2. Public sector’s regulation distinctiveness - composite indicator of five equal-
weight variables:  
5.2.1. public sector’s union density (UD_pub) 
5.2.2. public sector collective bargaining centralisation (European 
Commission 2013)  
5.2.3. public sector collective bargaining coverage (CovPub) 
5.2.4. legal constraints over public sector collective bargaining (European 
Commission 2013) 
5.2.5. unilateralism in public sector collective bargaining (European 
Commission 2013) 
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Each of the five categories is given equal weight as they have all been important 
areas of change in IR historically. Robustness checks show that varying the weight 
does not change the overall picture significantly, i.e. the relative position of countries 
in the scatter chart does not change. One sensitive variable is ‘support to actors’ 
through social pacts and tripartite commissions: if removed, on the grounds that 
some analysts (Ost 2000, Erne 2008) see these as merely illusory phenomena, 
Italy’s degree of state regulation falls below that of Germany. Yet the Italian case is 
exactly one where the incidence of social pacts (but not that of its muted tripartite 
commission) is stronger, as in the case of agreements strengthening collective 
bargaining articulation and employee workplace representation in 1993 or improving 
welfare benefits in 2007.4 
Both the associational and state regulation data can be summarised in composite 
indicators, to classify countries on two axes. To overcome the heterogeneity of the 
data, they are all normalised on a 0 to 1 scale, where the minimum and the 
maximum value (0 and 1) are placed at the minimum and maximum recorded value 
for any OECD country in 1992-2012 (standardisation would not make sense as it 
would force the same standard deviation on each indicator, despite their very 
different distribution). Conceptually, it is important to stress that all indicators involve 
some degree of intervention through either limitation of employer discretion or labour 
decommodification: forms of state intervention that directly support marketization are 
not included here. In an abstract, perfectly liberal labour market, the values on both 
axes would be zero.  
Figure 1 displays the position of the six countries in 1992 and 2012 and reveal some 
interesting situations. First, there is little evidence of convergence. The distances 
among the six countries are very similar in 1992 and 2012. It is also difficult to group 
them into ‘types’, although two couples of countries (France and Spain; Germany 
and Italy) are close. In particular, the presumed ‘southern European’ type (European 
Commission 2009) is not visible: there is no evident reason why Italy, with its higher 
union power and its less interfering state, should be classified with France rather 
than with Germany (the position of Italy as the country with the strongest degree of 
associational governance may be surprising but is accounted by higher union density 
and collective bargaining coverage than in Germany).  
Although there is no clear sign of convergence, there are indications of important 
change. The most frequent one is of a weakening of associational governance, 
accounted in particular by a decline in union density and collective bargaining. On 
this axis a predominant trajectory of liberalisation is visible, but without convergence: 
the countries that liberalise most are those that were already most liberal in 1992 
(UK and Poland) and are most influenced by FDI and migration. The two exceptions 
here are France and Spain. The position of France has hardly changed between the 
start and end points, but not because there has been no reform or innovation: rather, 
changes have gone in different directions and have compensated each other over 
the period (e.g. the Aubry laws fostering collective bargaining, and the Fillon one 
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decentralising it). Spain moves slightly to the right side. Like for France, its 2012 
position is the net result of years of contrasting trends rather than linear change, with 
the most important development being the effort at better co-ordinating IR during the 
1990s; nonetheless, radical reforms at the end of the analysed period are reversing 
the trend. 
The dominant trend of associational regulation decline has not led European 
countries to neoliberalism, though. An ideal laissez-faire type would be at zero on 
both axes. Ideal types are not registered in the real world, and for comparative 
purposes the figure includes the USA, the reference case for neoliberalism: while it is 
close to zero on the associational axis, it is still at over 0.2 on the state one, thanks 
to some minimum wage, public sector and welfare state interventions. Across 
countries there is no systematic change, and there is even one clear case of 
movement towards more state regulations, the UK under New Labour.  
Neoliberalism is distinguished from laissez-faire exactly for the role of state power – 
yet still in the pursuit of employer interests. Why did the state interventions in 
protection of employees not decline across our cases? The functionalist/instrumental 
explanation of neoliberalism legitimation (Baccaro and Howell 2017) finds some 
corroboration: the introduction of minimum wages is often associated with the 
hollowing out or even direct undermining of collective bargaining, and the focus on 
individual employment rights, in the UK and in the USA, did cast shadow on the 
collective ones (Pollert 2005, Piore and Safford 2006). Nonetheless, closer historical 
analysis raises doubts on generalising such functionalist argument. The interventions 
listed here go in the opposite direction to the neoliberal one of dispossessing 
employees and restoring employer discretion, which is meant to include limited and 
non-interventionist state, rejection of Keynesian demand management, labour 
market flexibility and removal of welfare benefits (Hay 2004). The introduction and 
increase of minimum wages and unemployment benefits, and the endurance or 
increase of social expenditure, have been generally opposed by the employers; 
when they were enacted by right-of-centre governments on occasion, it was in 
response to social demands, for electoral reasons or to limit protest (e.g. the 
abandonment of pension cuts in Italy in 1994 and in France in 1995, or, more 
recently, the increase of minimum wages in the UK and Poland). The increase in 
social expenditure (with the exception of post-communist Poland), although largely 
linked to the ageing society rather than increased public generosity, cannot be 
interpreted as simple neoliberal legitimation. Its functions may be changing, in 
particular towards activation and therefore market promotion, but most public 
expenditure still provides ‘decommodification’ of areas of people’s lives (Esping-
Andersen 1990) and public governance of market-originating risk (Crouch 2015). 
Therefore, if the crude figure of social expenditure does not tell the story of how 
money is spent, it still is a good indicator of market correction, across countries as 
well as time.  If we can therefore speak of neoliberalism in Europe, it is in a variety of 
‘social market’ versions or in a neo-Polanyan, state-embedded and protected form 
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(Gamble 2006) – not in a Reaganite ‘government is the problem’ sense, and not in 
the hyper-market version employed in most academic and political debates. 
The broader inclusion of the state is where this analysis differs from Baccaro and 
Howell’s (2017), who, by employing a one-dimensional axis of neoliberal change, 
and neglecting the roles of welfare state, public sector and social security, 
overestimate, or at least over-simplify neoliberal convergence in labour market 
regulation. The alternating trends of Spain (in the regulation of collective bargaining) 
and UK (in public sector policy), for instance, directly challenge their argument that 
centre-right and centre-left governments pursue the neoliberal strategy in the same 
way (Baccaro and Howell 2017: 185). In fact, whether government political 
orientations matter depends itself on the specific state political traditions, such as 
majority vs proportional systems of representation, with more policy continuity in the 
latter (e.g. Germany), but more discourse convergence (e.g. on modernisation in the 
UK) in the former given the electoral competition for median-voters.  
One last indication from the two axes is the weak correlation, whether positive or 
negative, between them, which challenges two competing classic interpretation of 
the relationship between states and IR. On one side, classic corporatist theory, 
which sees associational governance as an alternative to statist one and implies the 
deficiency of hybrid cases such as ‘statist’ forms of corporatism (Streeck and 
Schmitter 1985), would have forecast a negative correlation, i.e. a trade-off between 
the two forms of governance. Yet the only instances of such a trade-off across time 
are in the UK and Spain. On the other side, power resources theory (Korpi 1983) 
postulates a positive relation between labour movement strength (in particular union 
density) and both egalitarian collective bargaining and welfare state policies. The 
chart does display a degree of positive correlation between the two axes at given 
points in time (R2=0.21 in 1992 and 0.37 in 2012), yet this is paradoxically due 
mostly to the French and Spanish cases, where in fact union density is below 
average – which goes exactly against the theory. Moreover, there is no positive 
correlation over time, as the average for state regulation doesn’t change between 
1992 and 2012 despite the decline of associational governance and specifically 
union density. It appears, therefore, that large EU countries are best treated and 
understood as historically unique configurations, rather than cases fitting a universal 
law or trajectory. 
 
Conclusion 
Combining quantitative and qualitative information allows to address both ‘how’ 
(directions of change) and ‘why’ (historical causes) questions. Parallel strains on 
labour and collective bargaining have weakened associational governance in most 
large EU countries since 1992: the partial exceptions of France and Spain might only 
be late movers. Historical analysis suggests a causal link with the internationalisation 
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processes that have occurred, with a structural shift of power from labour to the more 
mobile capital. The fact that the pressures are visible everywhere regardless of the 
‘Variety of Capitalism’ strongly confirms that we are witnessing, in essence, one form 
of capitalism. 
Yet capitalism coexists with different IR institutions. Mixing capitalism and IR into one 
single assessment would conflate two very different levels of abstraction, i.e. the 
historic mode of production and the distinctive institutional way in which this is 
regulated. In other words, if all employees in Europe perceive the pressures of the 
same globalized capitalism, their employment security, social benefits, 
representation in the workplace still largely depends on the country they work in – 
and this depends on institutions and on power balance. 
International pressures operate differently depending on the power resources they 
affect (Wright 2000), and their interactions with national states. The rise of 
multinationals and competition for FDI has had the most straightforward effect: it has 
generally weakened labour’s political, market and social power, with some positive 
effects only in the isolated cases where it promotes industrial upgrading. Migration 
has weakened labour’s market and social power in receiving countries, but it has 
generally increased its political power given governments’ vulnerability to protest on 
this issue. This explains major concessions to labour in all five receiving states (free 
movement of labour also prompted stricter regulations on posted workers and 
collective bargaining in Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Switzerland). Conversely, in 
Poland, emigration increased labour’s market power, but not the political one. EU 
rules have had different effects depending on the period, the specific policies, and 
the member states, but overall it may be concluded that EU employment policies and 
regulations are strongly mediated by national traditions (Falkner et al. 2008, Meardi 
2011), the EMU has weakened unions’ market power by enforcing unit labour cost 
competition, and the most recent governance changes in the EMU have 
‘renationalised’ conflict (Erne 2015), weakening trade union associational power but 
not necessarily the political one (it may not be a coincidence that radical labour-
friendly parties have entered government in the two countries most deeply affected 
by new EU coercive demands, Greece and Portugal). 
The focus on discrete power effects on internationalisation and the inclusion of 
politics advances the typologies and interpretations of the last quarter of a century, 
from Crouch (1993) to Baccaro and Howell (2017). It explains how the EU increasing 
preference for capital interests has, paradoxically, increased the national political 
(state) dimension of IR, as labour could best react through politics. As Figure 1 
shows, the only case of clear neoliberal shift (towards the SW corner of the chart) is 
Poland, the country with the most unfavourable labour/capital composition and with 
historical traditions that clearly push change in that rejection. Yet even in Poland, 
and in other Central and Eastern European countries, that trend seems to have 
reached its limits with the election of populist government with a strong-state and 
paternalistic social policy agenda in 2015. Overall, this finding of liberalisation in 
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associational governance not matched by the same trend in state governance 
confirms the historical account by Thelen (2014), but with the added important 
specification that the difference is between modes, before than between areas, of 
governance. 
State-level developments have been too widespread and varied to be seen as 
merely instrumental. Historical attention to power relations within institutional 
traditions offers a deeper interpretation. If capitalism is under less pressure from 
organized labour, it still needs state protection from socio-political instability (or 
arguably, from itself). This confirms the unavoidable political dimension of labour 
relations, and more particularly, their historically institutionalised political nature in 
the largest European countries. Brexit, as a political event largely driven by social 
concerns over free movement of workers, appears therefore as an extreme case of a 
broader trend, rather than an exception. 
The process of change described in this article raises important issues. The shift 
from associational to state regulation may not be enough to prevent a degree of 
liberalisation, as in the UK case, where the relative increase in state regulation is 
weaker than the fall in the associational one. But it also raises new problems for 
democracy, with regard to space for institutional voice, to the implementation and 
sustainability of regulations, and to the political systems’ capacity to process 
complex economic and social demands. If, as Wright (2012) indicates, the most 
likely dimension of social transformation is the political, state-power one, the 
declination of associational and political resistance deserves deeper exploration 
(Hyman 2015).  
The analysis presented here has a number of limitations that require more 
discussion and investigation. Apart from being only focussed on the national level 
and overlooking regional and sectoral variation, and from looking at processes rather 
than outcomes (Thelen 2014, Crouch 2015, Kim et al. 2015), it is based on two 
snapshots, of which some (Germany and Poland in 1992, Italy and Spain in 2012) 
are taken on subjects in fast movement. More recent changes are not yet reflected in 
quantitative indicators.  
The available recent evidence, however, suggests that the latest crisis is not a mere 
continuation of a 30-year trend (Baccaro and Howell 2017), but rather an instance of 
governance change (Crouch 2015). The more recent reforms in Spain and Italy, but 
also in Germany, Poland and the UK (and arguably in Sweden) indicate change, but 
again no convergence. The associational indicator is being further lowered in some 
countries, especially through collective bargaining decentralisation in Spain and Italy 
and the reduction of union rights in the UK. Yet at the same time, and despite cuts to 
the welfare state in several countries, the indicator of state regulation tends to move 
upwards, most clearly in Germany where the introduction of a relatively high 
minimum wage and the reinforcement of collective agreement extension in 2015 
bring state regulation axis above the 1992 level. Policy interventions are visible 
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elsewhere, from the cautious introduction of universal unemployment benefits in 
Italy, to the national living wage and proposed stronger protections for dependent 
contractors in the UK, to redistributive policies and limits to precarious work in 
Poland. Frequent capitalist state regulation and paternalistic – rather than neoliberal 
– social policies are less surprising if we take a broader picture at international 
liberalisation and look at the relative success and expanding social policies of 
emerging economies with strong states (e.g. China, Brazil, Mexico, Turkey, 
Indonesia, South Africa). In Europe, internationalisation, through EU policies, 
multinationals and migration, tends to prompt political counter-movements in the 
Polanyian sense of social protection – not necessarily democratic, but always 
specific to local polities. 
 
1 Frankfurter Rundschau, the Guardian, Le monde, Repubblica, El País, Gazeta Wyborcza. 
2 Germany: CDU, die Linke; DGB, Ver-di, IG Metall, IG BAU; DBA, American Chamber of Commerce; Polish 
Social Council. UK: Department of Business, Innovation and Skills; TUC, Unite, Unison, GMB; CBI, EEF, ECIA; 
Federation of Poles in the UK. France: Ministère du Travail; Medef; CGT, CFDT. Italy: PD; CGIL, FIOM-CGIL, CISL, 
FIM-CISL; Assolombarda, American Chamber of Commerce; Anolf. Spain: Ministry of Labour, Consell Treball; 
CCOO, UGT; CEOE, Foment, PIMEC; Polish Association Madrid. Poland: Ministry of Labour; Solidarność, OPZZ, 
Budowlani; PKPP-Lewjatan, KbiN, American Chamber of Commerce; Migrant Workers’ Association. EU: EC, 
Social and Employment Affairs; BusinessEurope; EPSU. 
3 Interpolated values (linear) for missing values between available data are used. There are two exceptions to 
the interpolation methods. First, for employer density and public sector union density in Spain, given that in 
this country historical change has not been linear but curvilinear, the closest available data are used instead. 
Second, for public sector’s union density and collective bargaining coverage in Poland, as there are no data at 
all in the ICTWSS database, estimates from Eurofound on-line information are used.  
4 Like Baccaro and Howell, and as standard in the analysis of composite indicators, I run a Principal Component 
Analysis (PCA) on the indicators. On associational governance, PCA confirms the strong correlation between 
the collective bargaining variables, and adds a particular strong one between collective bargaining coverage 
and employer density (0.95). Employer density adds therefore little additional information, but it adds weight  
to the capital side of co-ordination that has become central in comparative capitalisms debates. On state 
governance, PCA indicates strikingly little correlation among the many indicators used here – and no factor 
that would have a clear empirical or theoretical reason. The original ‘raw’ indicators are therefore used in the 
axes. 
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TABLE 1 
Internationalisation and IR change  
FDI Migration EU 
 Magnitude IR effects Magnitude IR effects Magnitude IR effects 
D Medium 
20% GDP 
Labour-
weakening 
(concession barg.) 
 
Medium 
15% 
workforce 
Regulations 
(minimum 
wages) 
Low 
‘domestic 
politics’ 
Restructuring, 
reform agenda 
 
 
F High 
39% GDP 
Labour-
weakening  
(influence in 
employer org, 
concession barg.) 
 
High 
12% 
workforce 
Mobilisations 
(strikes) 
Medium 
‘neglect’ 
Employment 
recommendations 
 
UK High 
48% GDP 
Labour weakening 
(coll. barg. 
decentralisation)  
High 
13% 
workforce 
Regulations 
(gangmaster 
and agency 
rules, Brexit) 
 
Low 
‘domestic 
politics’ 
Employment law 
but opt-out from 
Lisbon Treaty, 
Brexit 
 
I Low 
16% GDP 
Labour weakening 
(calls for change, 
Fiat’s ‘exit’ from 
coll. barg.) 
 
Medium 
8% 
workforce 
Increased 
segmentation 
 
High 
‘dead letter’ 
ECB 
Employment 
recommendations 
 
E High 
44% GDP 
Mixed 
(distinctive 
policies) 
High 
15% 
workforce 
Increased 
segmentation 
 
 
High 
‘domestic 
politics’ 
ECB 
 
Employment 
recommendations 
 
PL High 
41% GDP 
Mixed 
(prominence in 
employer org) 
High (as 
exit) 
0.5% 
workforce 
Labour-
strengthening 
 
Medium 
‘dead letter’ 
accession 
conditionality 
Employment law, 
social dialogue 
capacity 
Sources: share of FDI stock in GDP: UNCTAD, 2010; share of foreign-born in working-age population: EU LFS, 
2007; ‘world of compliance’ on EU regulations: Falkner et al. (2008). 
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TABLE 2 
Associational governance indicators 
 
1992 
TUDens EmplDens CBCov Coord Centr(level) 
Germany 33.9 68 77.5 4 3.55 
France 9.6 74 94.5 2 3.10 
UK 39.8 48 43.5 1 1.67 
Italy 38.9 66 80.0 3 3.85 
Spain 16.5 72 88.6 2 3.50 
Poland 29.7 20 35.6 1 1.00 
 
2012 
Germany 17.9 58 54.9 4 2.85 
France 7.7 75 98.0 2 2.25 
UK 26.2 32 29.3 1 1.00 
Italy 36.9 56 80.0 3 2.85 
Spain 17.1 75 77.5 3 2.65 
Poland 12.7 20 14.7 1 1.00 
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TABLE 3 
State governance of employment relations 
1992 
WC MW MW% EPLr EPLt Gov 
Int 
Ext UB SE SP TC PS% PSreg 
D 6 0 0 2.58 3.25 2 1 29 25.5 0 0 0.21 0.70 
I 4 0 0 2.76 4.75 4 0 3 20.8 0.67 1 0.19 0.65 
F 4 2 46 2.34 3.63 3 3 38 26.6 0 1 0.29 0.74 
UK 1 1 0 1.03 0.25 1 0 18 19.9 0 0 0.19 0.48 
PL 1 2 33 2.23 0.75 3 0 38 24.9 0.67 0 0.43 0.86 
E 2 2 34.7 3.55 3.75 3 3 34 21.8 0.67 1 0.16 0.86 
2012 
 
        
    
D 6 1 0 2.87 1 2 1 24 25.9 0 0 0.15 0.61 
I 4 0 0 2.76 2 2 0 33 28 1 1 0.16 0.49 
F 2 2 48.5 2.39 3.63 3 3 39 32.5 0 1 0.27 0.73 
UK 2 2 38.9 1.2 0.38 1.5 0 16 23.9 0 0 0.24 0.44 
PL 2 2 32.4 2.23 1.75 2 1 20 20.6 0 2 0.21 0.50 
E 2 2 36.5 2.21 2.69 4 2 35 26.8 0.67 1 0.23 0.46 
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FIGURE 1 
Change in Industrial Relations, 1992-2012 
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